版主
- 积分
- 1249
- 获赠鲜花
- 11 朵
- 个人财富
- 5930 金币
- 注册时间
- 2011-1-18
|
楼主 |
发表于 2011-1-23 13:25
|
显示全部楼层
友情提示: 请千万不要登入陌生网站输入QQ号和密码,以防诈骗。
联系我时,请说明是从哪儿看到的,谢谢。
回复 1# 杠头儿
0 r% S( I( c" [; ?" n- f4 Y: N5 m' @. s4 n" N4 ]8 Y# n- A! I7 W) B
! a& F+ O2 T' p) |
" G7 \: x; H8 l) l2 z0 B4 sA concept (abstract term: conception) is a cognitive unit of meaning—an abstract idea or a mental symbol sometimes defined as a "unit of knowledge," built from other units which act as a concept's characteristics. A concept is typically associated with a corresponding representation in a language or symbology[citation needed] such as a single meaning of a term.0 ], `. k1 \& r: O
There are prevailing theories in contemporary philosophy which attempt to explain the nature of concepts. The representational theory of mind proposes that concepts are mental representations, while the semantic theory of concepts (originating with Frege's distinction between concept and object) holds that they are abstract objects.[1] Ideas are taken to be concepts, although abstract concepts do not necessarily appear to the mind as images as some ideas do.[2] Many philosophers consider concepts to be a fundamental ontological category of being.
! B5 g- N0 I0 b) ~$ mThe meaning of "concept" is explored in mainstream cognitive science, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. The term "concept" is traced back to 1554–60 (Latin conceptum - "something conceived"),[citation needed] but what is today termed "the classical theory of concepts" is the theory of Aristotle on the definition of terms.[citation needed]
K2 |# C. D% R& w( r 8 F; x9 R- w$ _
Origin and acquisition of concepts- B, f9 }4 @' w; e3 k: N
A posterior abstractions" v' u# X* R7 [& ?% m4 P
John Locke's description of a general idea corresponds to a description of a concept. According to Locke, a general idea is created by abstracting, drawing away, or removing the common characteristic or characteristics from several particular ideas. This common characteristic is that which is similar to all of the different individuals. For example, the abstract general idea or concept that is designated by the word "red" is that characteristic which is common to apples, cherries, and blood. The abstract general idea or concept that is signified by the word "dog" is the collection of those characteristics which are common to Airedales, Collies, and Chihuahuas.4 D' Y8 ^+ K# d; x/ B& A9 v# X6 v d+ \
In the same tradition as Locke, John Stuart Mill stated that general conceptions are formed through abstraction. A general conception is the common element among the many images of members of a class. "...[W]hen we form a set of phenomena into a class, that is, when we compare them with one another to ascertain in what they agree, some general conception is implied in this mental operation" (A System of Logic, Book IV, Ch. II). Mill did not believe that concepts exist in the mind before the act of abstraction. "It is not a law of our intellect, that, in comparing things with each other and taking note of their agreement, we merely recognize as realized in the outward world something that we already had in our minds. The conception originally found its way to us as the result of such a comparison. It was obtained (in metaphysical phrase) by abstraction from individual things" (Ibid.).4 @( S- v6 V9 z$ j8 k( `
For Schopenhauer, empirical concepts "...are mere abstractions from what is known through intuitive perception, and they have arisen from our arbitrarily thinking away or dropping of some qualities and our retention of others." (Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol. I, "Sketch of a History of the Ideal and the Real"). In his On the Will in Nature, "Physiology and Pathology," Schopenhauer said that a concept is "drawn off from previous images ... by putting off their differences. This concept is then no longer intuitively perceptible, but is denoted and fixed merely by words." Nietzsche, who was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, wrote: "Every concept originates through our equating what is unequal. No leaf ever wholly equals another, and the concept 'leaf' is formed through an arbitrary abstraction from these individual differences, through forgetting the distinctions..."[3]
8 W U3 O& [! {# D7 W1 c' |% N8 fBy contrast to the above philosophers, Immanuel Kant held that the account of the concept as an abstraction of experience is only partly correct. He called those concepts that result of abstraction "a posteriori concepts" (meaning concepts that arise out of experience). An empirical or an a posteriori concept is a general representation (Vorstellung) or non-specific thought of that which is common to several specific perceived objects (Logic, I, 1., §1, Note 1).
- i/ @3 A8 E( CA concept is a common feature or characteristic. Kant investigated the way that empirical a posteriori concepts are created.
% ~+ B* v2 m4 n1 c
0 M$ p# f$ P7 F: W
$ g, b) N: H- @
+ X$ T% H; V* U- ? 1 } r* {! f( ]1 |
The logical acts of the understanding by which concepts are generated as to their form are:
- p, m) F9 f1 O9 i- comparison, i.e., the likening of mental images to one another in relation to the unity of consciousness;
- reflection, i.e., the going back over different mental images, how they can be comprehended in one consciousness; and finally
- abstraction or the segregation of everything else by which the mental images differ ... In order to make our mental images into concepts, one must thus be able to compare, reflect, and abstract, for these three logical operations of the understanding are essential and general conditions of generating any concept whatever. For example, I see a fir, a willow, and a linden. In firstly comparing these objects, I notice that they are different from one another in respect of trunk, branches, leaves, and the like; further, however, I reflect only on what they have in common, the trunk, the branches, the leaves themselves, and abstract from their size, shape, and so forth; thus I gain a concept of a tree.
– Logic, §6 4 `9 X0 @* C3 I$ ]
Kant's description of the making of a concept has been paraphrased as "...to conceive is essentially to think in abstraction what is common to a plurality of possible instances..." (H.J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysics of Experience, I, 250). In his discussion of Kant, Christopher Janaway wrote: "...generic concepts are formed by abstraction from more than one species."[4]
5 T5 x) ^9 s( I1 MA priori conceptsMain article: Category (Kant)" B3 `9 _7 g! G: I
7 a1 y3 E3 m+ X
Kant declared that human minds possess pure or a priori concepts. Instead of being abstracted from individual perceptions, like empirical concepts, they originate in the mind itself. He called these concepts categories, in the sense of the word that means predicate, attribute, characteristic, or quality. But these pure categories are predicates of things in general, not of a particular thing. According to Kant, there are 12 categories that constitute the understanding of phenomenal objects. Each category is that one predicate which is common to multiple empirical concepts. In order to explain how an a priori concept can relate to individual phenomena, in a manner analogous to an a posteriori concept, Kant employed the technical concept of the schema. n9 y1 ~# O5 c! _. y; E3 m( Z
! b0 h# I7 k, Z0 v: W
Conceptual structure, K% A* `% ] P+ g! r- V( g
7 v; _) k5 h9 F4 y3 e9 R4 b7 X & Q/ k! ~) n5 a% }3 W& u
It seems intuitively obvious that concepts must have some kind of structure. Up until recently, the dominant view of conceptual structure was a containment model, associated with the classical view of concepts. According to this model, a concept is endowed with certain necessary and sufficient conditions in their description which unequivocally determine an extension. The containment model allows for no degrees; a thing is either in, or out, of the concept's extension. By contrast, the inferential model understands conceptual structure to be determined in a graded manner, according to the tendency of the concept to be used in certain kinds of inferences. As a result, concepts do not have a kind of structure that is in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions; all conditions are contingent (Margolis:5).
# k7 s5 j+ L4 T2 tHowever, some theorists claim that primitive concepts lack any structure at all. For instance, Jerry Fodor presents his Asymmetric Dependence Theory as a way of showing how a primitive concept's content is determined by a reliable relationship between the information in mental contents and the world. These sorts of claims are referred to as "atomistic", because the primitive concept is treated as if it were a genuine atom. |
|